Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-22-2018

An Analysis of Multi-domain Command and
Control and the Development of Software
Solutions through DevOps Toolsets and Practices
Mason R. Bruza

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, and the Software Engineering
Commons
Recommended Citation
Bruza, Mason R., "An Analysis of Multi-domain Command and Control and the Development of Software Solutions through DevOps
Toolsets and Practices" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 1798.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1798

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

AN ANALYSIS OF MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS THROUGH DEVOPS
TOOLSETS AND PRACTICES
THESIS

Mason R. Bruza, Capt, USAF
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-016
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United
States Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not
subject to copyright protection in the United States.

AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-016

AN ANALYSIS OF MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS THROUGH DEVOPS TOOLSETS
AND PRACTICES

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Cyber Operations

Mason R. Bruza, BS
Captain, USAF

March 22, 2018
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-016

AN ANALYSIS OF MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS THROUGH DEVOPS TOOLSETS
AND PRACTICES

Mason R. Bruza, B.S.
Capt, USAF

Committee Membership:

Lt Col Mark G. Reith, Ph.D.
Chair

Lt Col Logan O. Mailloux, Ph.D.
Member

Maj Alan C. Lin, Ph.D.
Member

AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-016
Abstract
Multi-Domain Command and Control (MDC2) is the exercise of command and control
over forces in multiple operational domains (namely air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace)
in order to produce synergistic effects in the battlespace, and enhancing this capability
has become a major focus area for the United States Air Force (USAF). In order to meet
demands for MDC2 software, solutions need to be acquired and/or developed in a timely
manner, information technology infrastructure needs to be adaptable to new software
requirements, and user feedback needs to drive iterative updates to fielded software. In
commercial organizations, agile software development methodologies and concepts such
as DevOps have been implemented to meet these demands. However, the USAF has been
slow to adopt modern agile software development concepts such as DevOps in favor of
traditional software development lifecycles and large contracts that can go nearly a
decade without any value being released to the users. This work explores MDC2
software use cases and aims to show that MDC2 software can be successfully developed
using modern agile software development practices in a timely manner. The contributions
in this work have been published in two conference papers, and are pending publication
in one journal article.
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AN ANALYSIS OF MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS THROUGH DEVOPS TOOLSETS
AND PRACTICES
I. Introduction
1.1 Framing the Problem
Command and Control (C2), in essence, is the passing of decision-quality
information from one person or group of people to another in order to make decisions
and/or take actions based on the decisions that have been made. This process of decisionmaking and information passing becomes more difficult as the number of people
involved and the amount and/or complexity of the information increases. Multi-Domain
Command and Control (MDC2) is in essence no different from single-domain command
and control, but is nevertheless considerably more difficult because adding more
operational domains to the command and control process greatly increases the number of
people involved and the amount and complexity of information needed to make a
decision. MDC2 is further complicated because information regarding one domain may
be simple to someone familiar with that domain, but indecipherable to a person from
another domain, so the same information can be simple or complex depending on who is
looking at it.
Enhancing C2 involves reducing the number of people involved in making a
decision, reducing the time it takes to pass information from one person/group to another
person/group, making complex information easier to understand, and/or reducing the
amount of information that is passed up and down the chain through changes in
structure/processes as well as technical solutions. For example, using a decentralized C2
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structure allows decisions to be made at lower levels which both reduces the number of
people required to make a decision and it can ensure that the decisions are made by
people with the greatest understanding of the information used to make the decision. An
example of a technical solution would be an application that pulls needed information
from several data sources and displays it in an intuitive format which reduces the time it
takes for C2 personnel to receive the information they need and makes complex
information more understandable with intuitive formatting. These same concepts apply
when you add multiple domains to the C2 process, only the problem becomes more
complex because of the additional personnel and information involved.
Enhancing the Air Force’s MDC2 capabilities will require experimental
campaigns to test new ideas whether they are technical solutions, changes to C2 structure
or decision-making processes. As C2 operators test different solutions, feedback is
collected and changes are made accordingly. Since enhancing MDC2 will be an iterative
process, the software development lifecycle should be iterative as well in order to
respond to changing user requirements. In other words, MDC2 software should be
developed using agile software development concepts such as DevOps.
DevOps is an agile software development concept that seeks to use practices and
toolsets that integrate Information Technology (IT) infrastructure operation teams with
software development teams in order to release new code frequently into the production
environment. It has become popular in the private sector, but has not been adopted by the
military. In light of these observations, this thesis answers the following research
questions:
1. How can software enhance the Air Force’s ability to conduct MDC2?
2

2. What software development practices have attributes that will aid MDC2
software development and experimentation?
3. What are the key attributes of the AOC Pathfinder Project that enabled
it to develop software using DevOps?
1.2 Hypothesis
DevOps toolsets and practices are effective at developing C2 software, and can be
successfully implemented by the Air Force to enhance its MDC2 capabilities. This is
shown by first examining the MDC2 problem and developing use cases that have
possible software solutions and then demonstrating the effectiveness of DevOps for
developing software for command control centers.
1.3 Methodology
The research for this work involves two major lines of effort. The first focuses on
examining the MDC2 problem, and includes participation in two different MDC2
working groups that produced reports for USAF senior leaders and site visits to the 609th
Combined Air Operations Center and the 624th (cyberspace) Operations Center. The
second line of effort focused on DevOps and the ability of the USAF to successfully use
DevOps toolsets and practices to develop C2 software, and involved more than 4 months
of hands on experience with the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) working
on the Air Operation Center (AOC) Pathfinder project security and platform team. These
two lines of effort provided the background knowledge and observational data to answer
the research questions
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1.4 Document Structure
The bulk of the work in this thesis has been published or submitted for publication
by the author in [6], [8], and [9]. Additionally, the author has presented material at two
academic conferences and as lectures for three AFIT courses. Chapter II covers the
content of [6], focusing on analyzing the MDC2 problem and answering research
question one. Chapter III covers the content of [8], and examines how software should be
developed for MDC2 use cases and shows how DevOps meets the requirements for
MDC2 software development more effectively than traditional military software
development practices in order to answer research question two. Chapter IV, covering the
content of [9], is an experience report of the work being done by AOC Pathfinder, and
shows that DevOps toolsets and practices can be used to effectively develop C2 software
for Air Force operations centers. It examines key lessons learned for implementing
DevOps for military software development in order to answer research question three.
Chapter V presents a final analysis of the research done for this work and concludes.
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II. Multi-Domain Command and Control: The Need for Capability Transparency
2.1

Introduction
Over the past century military technology has advanced at an unparalleled rate

resulting in the creation of three distinct operational domains, so in addition to Land and
Sea we now have Air, Space, and Cyberspace. Not only have new domains been created,
but there is an unimaginable number of different assets and capabilities in each domain
for commanders to choose from to accomplish their mission. Modern militaries need to
operate in all of these domains, and be able to synergize assets and capabilities from
different domains to create desired effects in order to accomplish the mission. A key
issue faced by multi-domain planners is the lack of asset transparency; assets in domains
like Space and Cyberspace are not likely owned by the planner’s organization, so the
planner may not even know they are available for use. Then there are additional
considerations unique to each domain that need to be taken into account, such as the
possible loss of an intelligence source when a cyber capability is used offensively. As we
examine solutions for MDC2 we must also look at what approval authority level is
appropriate for any given asset/capability. This chapter examines these problems facing
MDC2 and proffers a technical solution that gives planners the full picture of all the
assets and capabilities available to them, and allows them to see what effects they can
create by combining assets together. The solution will be compatible with current
command and control paradigms, but also provides a framework for future advancement
in MDC2.
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2.2 Motivation
Many United States Air Force (USAF) leaders have recognized the need for more
agile command and control, and this can be seen in documents such as the Air Force
Future Operating Concept (AFFOC) which makes operational agility the central idea of
how the USAF will operate in the year 2035 [15]. In the AFFOC, operational agility is
defined to be: “the ability to rapidly generate—and shift among—multiple solutions for a
given challenge.” Because the solution(s) for a given challenge could come from any
operational domain, in order to fully achieve operational agility in modern environments
it is necessary to develop integrated MDC2 capabilities. Any organization that operates in
multiple domains needs to be able to exercise C2 over these domains. This need is
substantiated not only in doctrinal documents like the AFFOC, but by senior military
leaders including the Air Force Chief of Staff who has made enhancing MDC2 one of his
personal focus areas as Chief of Staff saying:
“Achieving a military advantage will depend on harnessing the vast amount of
information our sensors can generate, fusing it quickly into decision-quality information,
and creating effects simultaneously from any domain, region or command anywhere in
the world. This is why my third focus area is enhancing multi-domain command and
control.[25]”
It's clear that MDC2 is a vital area for C2 research with immediate applications
for military organizations operating in the modern world. The goal of this chapter is to
identify key requirements for MDC2 and offer a possible technical solution with
attributes that can meet these requirements. The question will be examined primarily
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from a USAF perspective with special focus on cyberspace integration, but without loss
of generality for other organizations.
2.3 Definition of Multi-Domain Command and Control
According to the Air Force Chief of Staff’s directive, MDC2 is not just
commanding and controlling operations in multiple domains at the same time, or even
just utilizing capabilities one domain to support operations in another domain. A vision

Figure 1: MDC2 Vision [58]
for MDC2 is neatly summarized in Figure 1. MDC2 starts with data collection from
multiple sources; this includes Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance as well as
other data sources such as weather forecasts, maintenance schedules, or other information
regarding the status of blue forces. This data must then be processed and displayed
effectively in order to enable rapid decision making and produce effects. The key is that
this process should be completely domain agnostic. Data from multiple domains should
7

be collected and processed by experts in those domains, and then presented to decision
makers who will select a course of action to produce the effects needed to accomplish
their mission. This course of action can include capabilities and assets from multiple
domains all working together to produce the needed effects in the battlespace.
Now we can summarize the Air Force’s vision for MDC2 as “integrated
awareness of the operational environment to enable rapid discernment of decision-quality
information, integrate global and regional capabilities with effective command
relationships and operate with agility and resilience in, from, and through the air, space,
and cyberspace domains.” If we look closely at that vision then we can pick out two key
requirements:
•

Integrated Awareness

•

Effective Command Relationships

Without these two attributes, it is impossible to conduct MDC2. Decision makers
must have an integrated awareness of all the domains in order to be able to make good
decisions, and once the course of action is decided there must be an effective command
relationship to execute that course of action. Now we will look at these requirements in
detail.
First, we will look at integrated awareness. Integrated awareness refers to the
ability for MDC2 planners to have a full picture of the battlespace that integrates all of
the operational domains, and have full awareness of capabilities that are available to
create effects. Currently, the Air Force and other military services are limited to seeing an
operational picture for a single domain at a time without any way of correlating the
information with the other domains (there may be some elements of other domains in
8

these pictures, but full awareness of the domain is not provided). In order to have
effective MDC2, we must be able to present a full picture of the battlespace to MDC2
planners with all of the domains seamlessly integrated. Without this full awareness,
MDC2 planners may end up over focusing on one domain to the detriment of the others
and miss opportunities to create synergistic effects. Achieving this will require new ways
of visualizing the operational domains and showcasing the relationships between them,
and innovative technical means of presenting this information to the MDC2 planners. It is
tempting to try and achieve this by trying to throw all of the data on a screen, but we
should be careful to not overwhelm operators with too much information nor should we
force one domain to present its data in an inefficient manner in order to compromise with
another domain.
One possible solution would be to have different views as required to optimally
represent the battlespace for each domain with links from one view to the next as the
domains interact. For example, there could be a geospatial view with a traditional map
showing all of the air/land assets and targets in theater according to their location, but
when you select a target (such as a building) you can see that it has a cyber footprint and
follow a link to the cyberspace view. Now you see a network diagram which shows how
that target fits into the overall cyberspace picture, how the target can be affected in
cyberspace, and has geographic data to link cyberspace targets to geospatial targets. The
planners can go back and forth between the geospatial and network views, and effects
represented on one view are automatically reflected on the other views. In our example
that means a cyber effect against a router in the network view could be reflected in the
geospatial view by showing that a target can’t communicate. A series of separate but
9

linked visualizations could provide the integrated awareness we need without resulting in
a data deluge.
In addition to presenting a full battlespace picture, we also must present all of the
effect producing capabilities available to MDC2 planners, and ensure that they are aware
of the constraints on these capabilities as well as the effects that they can produce. This is
especially important in non-physical domains such as Cyberspace because cyber
capabilities are not likely to be under the direct control of the MDC2 planners. Because
of classification constraints, the details of some capabilities will have to be abstracted
away, and they will have to coordinate with the owners of these capabilities in order to
produce the desired effects. Which ties into the second major concept.
Next, we examine the requirement for effective command relationships. In order
to operate in multiple domains, there also needs to be effective command relationships
between owners/executors of the capabilities and the MDC2 planners charged with
creating effects in theater. Unfortunately, planners in an operation center will not always
have direct operational control over the assets/capabilities they need, so the relationship
between planners and those with operational control over capabilities/assets needs to be
fostered and effective channels of communication maintained. Since the U.S. operates in
multiple theaters at once, resources are scarce and many capabilities are high-demand and
low-density, so planners in different theaters may desire the same high-demand capability
and only one will be able to utilize it. Who will decide which planner gets the capability?
How do we ensure that the decision is made quickly and effectively? In addition to
conflicts there are concerns specific to each domain that may necessitate a higher
approval authority for planners to use the resource. There is not a one-size-fits-all answer
10

to these questions so they will often have to be dealt with on a case by case basis for each
asset/capability. In order to overcome these obstacles, we must have effective lines of
communication between planners and the approval authority for the capabilities that they
need to use.
Meeting these two requirements should be the goal of any proposed MDC2
solutions. It’s also highly unlikely that any single solution, whether it be technical,
doctrinal, or organizational, is going to perfectly meet these requirements. Which means
that developing effective MDC2 solutions should be an iterative process. We need to be
open to experimenting with imperfect solutions and ensure that C2 operators are highly
involved in the development process.
2.4 Distinguishing MDC2 from Joint Operations
Now that we have defined MDC2, we can examine it in light of current
Joint Operational doctrine because MDC2 and Joint Operations are closely related
concepts. At first glance, it may seem like MDC2 is simply Joint C2. However, though
they are related, they are indeed different concepts, so it is important that we distinguish
the two. According to Joint Publication 3-30, Joint C2:
“encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over
assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. Command includes both the
authority and responsibility to use resources to accomplish assigned missions. Control is
inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent
with a commander’s command authority. Control provides the means for commanders to
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maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and
integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area (OA). [14]”
From the JP 3-30, we can see that Joint C2 is similar to MDC2 because the Joint
Forces Commander (JFC) must exercise command and control over forces in multiple
domains and ensure integration and synchronization between forces in multiple domains
in order to accomplish the mission. However, in practice this has meant that the JFC
relies on component commanders who are given distinct objectives for their domain that
they must accomplish. While the objectives of each component are integrated so that they
all contribute to accomplishing a single goal, the result is that the component
commanders primarily operate in a single domain with limited support from other
domains. More often than not, forces in different domains operate in parallel rather than
being fully integrated. MDC2 seeks to avoid this stove piping of the components, and
encourage multi-domain thinking at lower levels. The Joint Forces Air Component
Commander (JFACC) should not be limited to the air domain to accomplish the mission,
the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) should not be limited to the
sea domain, and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) should not be
limited to the land domain. MDC2 breaks down the walls between the domains, and
ensures that we are truly operating jointly.
We should not see MDC2 doctrine as something opposed to Joint
Operational doctrine as if we can only do one or the other, but rather we should
understand MDC2 as a more effective means of accomplishing the objectives set by the
JFC. When our forces are stove-piped into their domains the component commander’s
options are severely limited. However, if each component commander is able utilize
12

multiple domains then they are given a full range of options, are able to use multiple
attack vectors, and ultimately can more effectively accomplish their mission.
2.5 Air Force Specific MDC2 Challenges
For the Air Force, developing MDC2 capability means reevaluating the Air
Operation Center (AOC) model, and making the necessary changes in Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and
Policy (DOTMLPF-P) in order to eventually transform them into what the AFFOC calls
Multi-Domain Operating Centers (MDOC). According to the AFFOC “The MDOC
provides the Air Force with the ability to plan, conduct, and assess integrated
multidomain operations. [15]” While there is already some integration between domains
within the AOC in the form of liaisons from land, sea, space, and cyberspace working
alongside the air operators, these liaisons do not currently have the integrated awareness
nor the effective command relationships to properly conduct MDC2. Cyberspace in
particular is difficult to integrate with the physical domains, so we will look closely at
some specific challenges for integrating cyberspace operations within the AOC.
One major obstacle is the 72-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle. In an AOC, a
new ATO is planned, drafted, and approved every 72 hours, and operations within an
AOC revolve around this cycle. This is a challenge for cyber planners because of the
additional complexities inherent in cyber operations. If an air planner is given a set of
targets that need to be destroyed, then they can look at the air assets available to them,
select the munitions needed to destroy the target (maybe with the aid of SMEs), and plan
the operation. However, in order to produce effects in cyberspace it is not that simple
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because “cyber munitions” are inherently more complex than munitions in the physical
domains. For a physical munition, we know exactly what the effect is going to be, and we
can know with almost absolute certainty that it will always be effective against a target.
Whereas, any given cyber munition relies on the target having specific technical
vulnerabilities, and these differ widely from target to target. For example, a cyber
capability may be effective against Unix systems, but not Windows systems; it may even
require a specific version of Unix that is running a vulnerable service. This means it takes
a significantly greater amount of preparation to create a cyber effect (known as
operational preparation of the environment or OPE). Also, once the cyber munition is
used there is a chance that the enemy is able to patch their systems and effectively render
that munition obsolete (also known as technical loss). If we can imagine this in the air
domain, it would be like having to design and manufacture a new missile for each target
we identify, and once the missile is used it may not be effective again even against the
same target. This makes it very difficult to plan cyberspace operations within the 72-hour
ATO cycle. Especially when the planners have difficulty even knowing what is available
to them.
Which brings us to another major challenge, which is that unlike physical
domains, cyberspace assets and capabilities are scattered across many different
organizations, including many outside of the DoD. This means that the cyber planners in
an AOC often do not have direct control over any cyberspace resources at all. Any cyber
effects that planners within the AOC need are going to come from outside organizations.
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The current force structure can be seen in Figure 2 below. We can see that there is an

Figure 2: Force Structure [21]
avenue for the JFACC to request cyber effects from Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber
(JFHQ-Cyber) which has operational control of the Cyber Mission Teams, but in practice
this is incredibly difficult and doesn’t usually happen. We can get a first-hand look at this
problem from Capt. Michael Dunn who served as a cyber liaison within the AOC at alUdeid during the summer of 2015, and explained in an interview that when they needed a
cyber effect as part of an operation there was essentially one Air Force cyber unit that
they went to for support, and they relied on email and personal contacts to request effects
rather than a formal C2 system or process. There was also not an effective operational
relationship with the cyber component of CENTCOM; there were regular teleconferences
that gave AOC planners awareness of what the cyber component was doing at the
strategic level, but there was not any awareness at the operational level or an efficient
means of requesting cyber effects. How can cyber planners effectively integrate cyber
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operations with Air operations if they have no way of knowing what capabilities are
available to them?
2.6 Related Work
While MDC2 itself is a relatively new concept, it builds on areas of C2 that are
well researched. Especially recent work highlighting the need for
decentralized/distributed approaches to C2.
Vassiliou explains the trend towards decentralized C2 paradigms in which you
have “edge” organizations making the decisions and sharing information [49]. The key
tenets of this “net-centric” approach are:
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
2. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and
shared situational awareness.
3. Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization
4. The above dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
Decentralized organization have been proven to make more effective decisions
than organizations with traditional hierarchies. When information is shared directly from
those who initially ingest/analyze the data to those who need the data to make a decision
it has a much lower chance of being misunderstood than if the information was passed
through several hierarchical layers before getting where it needs to be. US military
doctrine has been moving towards a decentralized C2 structure, but implementation has
been slow. As Vassiliou explains:
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“Moving from a centralized, hierarchical C2 paradigm to a more decentralized
one, even in only a subset of situations, requires considerable effort in changing the
command culture. Higher levels of command must become accustomed to delegating and
not over-specifying or micromanaging missions. Lower levels must become accustomed
to taking initiative and not receiving highly detailed orders.”
The key to an effective decentralized C2 paradigm is that all of the edge
organizations share the same situational awareness. Information must be freely flowing
for this model to be effective. As we saw earlier, the situational awareness needed to
make decentralized C2 effective is also required for effective MDC2.
Levchuk and Pattipati investigated whether C2 structures designed by algorithms
could be as effective as structures designed by C2 experts [33]. Their results not only
showed that optimization algorithms are capable of producing more effective C2
structures, but also that the reason these structures are more effective is because they
were more distributed/decentralized architectures. The structure designed by the
algorithm effectively distributed engagement loads among all commanders in the
simulation, minimized coordination requirements between commanders by giving them
more authority and resources, and ultimately it reduced the number of commanders
needed per operation. The results of Levchuk and Pattipati’s study shows that distributed
C2 structures are better able to achieve decision superiority which confirms the trend
analysis done by Vassiliou.
In a 2012 paper, Alberts and Vassiliou examine four distinct C2 trends, and
analyze their scientific and technological implications [50]. The four trends identified are:
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•

The extremely broad availability of advanced information and
communications technologies that place unprecedented powers of
information creation, processing, and distribution in the hands of almost
anyone who wants them—friend and foe alike

•

The increasing complexity of endeavors as military establishments form
coalitions with each other, and partnerships with various civilian agencies
and non-governmental organizations

•

The rising importance of decentralized, net-enabled approaches to C2

•

The data deluge—the unprecedented volumes of raw and processed
information with which human actors and C4ISR systems must contend.

MDC2 can be seen as a development resulting from first three trends identified here. The
“data deluge” is something that will be compounded by attempts to engage in MDC2
because adding additional domains dramatically increases the amount of data that C2
operators need to shift through in order to make decisions. The key is to identify the
information that C2 operators need to do their mission, present that information to them,
and cut out everything that is not needed.
General Hostage has also highlighted distributed control as a necessary
component for resilient C2 structures [27]. Reinforcing the conclusions reached by the
C2 academic community, General Hostage proposes that the Air Force replace its longheld tenant of “centralized control; decentralized execution” with “centralized command,
distributed control, and decentralized execution.” By this he means that command
authority still remains centralized, but direct control is distributed among subordinate
units. As the literature shows, this results in better decisions and faster decision making.
18

However, what is not directly covered in the academic sources is the resiliency that this
model also provides. If subordinate units are prepared to exercise control, then operations
can continue to run smoothly even if communications with the command authority are
disrupted. In a personal interview, General Hostage also highlighted how distributed
control can allow us to keep critical command centers stateside rather than being in
theater, and thereby reducing the attack surface presented to the adversary.
As the literature shows, decentralization and distribution should be key attributes
of any proposed MDC2 structures or technical solutions. We’ve also identified the need
for shared situational awareness and the ability to know what capabilities are available in
other domains. This ability to have awareness of all available capabilities can be called
“capability transparency”, and it is a necessary attribute for effective MDC2. If planners
do not know what is available to them from other domains, then they will neglect those
capabilities even if they would more effectively accomplish the mission. Right now, there
are not any systems for planners to see the non-air capabilities available to them. As
Capt. Dunn explained, cyber liaisons in the AOC today rely on informal channels to gain
this awareness, and even the awareness they do get is extremely limited [18]. This
chapter will now propose a technical solution that can support distributed control and
provide planners with capability transparency to enable effective MDC2.
2.7 Proposed Technical Solution
We’ve identified distributed control and capability transparency as requirements
for effective MDC2. Figure 3 shows us key attributes of a technical system to address this
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Figure 3: Proposed System Attributes
need. In this system, resources (objectives, intel, target lists, assets, and capabilities) are
decomposed into logical units that can be assembled dynamically based on the effects
that the planners need to create to accomplish the commander’s intent. The Joint
Prioritized Target List (JPTL) and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) would both be
maintained to keep in line with the JFC’s intent, and the data for assets and capabilities
would be provided by the owners of those capabilities/assets themselves. Capability
owners would input the capabilities they are able to offer, and the attributes of that
capability such as the kind of effect it creates, what kinds of targets it’s effective against,
estimate of preparation time needed, contacts for coordination, or any other information
that planners need for decision making. They can then assemble these units together
using established formulas to produce synergistic effects; new formulas could be added
and old formulas can be changed as Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) develop
as the system is used. All assets are able to be seen by the “mission assemblers” including
those directly under their control (Apportioned Assets) and those which they must request
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from other organizations (Assigned Assets). This final process is known as “mission
assembly” and is the heart and soul of the system, and it’s essentially the process of
aligning available assets/capabilities against the targets, constraints, and requirements are
given by the JFC.
A system with these attributes would be able to provide cyber planners in the
AOC with the capability transparency they need to efficiently integrate cyber effects into
the Air Tasking Order. There may be some cyber capabilities that are capable of
producing effects almost immediately, but many capabilities will still require a lengthy
OPE period. This system would let planners see an estimate of how much time is needed
for OPE, so that they can begin the preparations well ahead of time. This likely means
that cyber planning really has to start in the target identification step of the planning
process, so that when effects are needed the they can be planned within the 72hr ATO
timeframe. More importantly, it can be useful for planners in all branches, and brings us
one step closer to truly domain-agnostic planning.
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Figure 4 gives us a sample application architecture with the primary components
necessary to enable effective MDC2. The application itself is simple, reliable, and

Figure 4: Application Architecture
endlessly extensible. These attributes are absolutely necessary for any technical MDC2
solution since MDC2 doctrine is still in its early development stages. The proposed
solution is a two-layered system that will allow capability owners to publish capabilities,
targets and constraints to be set by the JFC, and gives MDC2 planners a Mission
Assembler that can match capabilities to targets and constraints in order to produce the
effects necessary to accomplish their objectives.
The database layer takes input from capability owners and the Joint Staff to
provide the application layer with the data necessary to do mission assembly (as
explained previously). Targets are identified, constraints established, and capabilities are
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published. Then capabilities can be selected based on whether they are effective against a
target and meet the established constraints (e.g. lead time or rules of engagement), and if
these capabilities aren’t under the direct control of the planners then the planners will be
able to contact the appropriate authority to request the capability. Then once the mission
is assembled, those responsible for execution can then start carrying out the preparation
needed to accomplish the mission as planned in this system. Note that the proposed
system is primarily a planning solution, so the execution of the assembled mission is not
a concern at this point.
The system will be built on a cloud platform, making it easily accessible and
resilient. The distributed system architecture also places the system in line with the
decentralized C2 paradigms suggested by the latest research because it can be utilized by
edge organizations and provides the situational awareness necessary for net-centric
decentralized C2. It also enables distributed control by providing a platform that gives
planners full situational awareness and the ability to rapidly assemble missions based on
commander’s intent. Most importantly, since no system is perfect, it’s extensible and can
be quickly updated as new requirements are identified.
This proposal should be seen as a starting point not the final solution. As
mentioned in previous sections, application developers should keep C2 operators
involved throughout the entire development process because ultimately the measurement
of success is how well the application helps the operators do their job. As features are
implemented, the developers can collect feedback from operators and refactor as needed.
This iterative development cycle continues as needed to meet the requirements of the
operators.
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2.7 Future Work and Conclusion
The next step for this research effort is to implement a prototype of the system
and gather feedback from subject matter experts. There are also many other questions that
need to be answered:
•

General Robert Elder has suggested that MDC2 entails the full spectrum of the
instruments of power ranging from traditional military assets/capabilities to
diplomatic actions. Should non-military effects be part of MDC2? How can they
be integrated?

•

What does Battle Management look like in MDC2? Should planning systems also
be used for Battle Management?

•

Cloud computing has many benefits for C2 systems, but how can we ensure that
the systems are secure?

•

What can be automated? How can we create the most effective human-machine
teams?

•

How do we resolve conflicts over limited resources (namely cyber capabilities)?

•

Who should make decisions regarding intel gain/loss and technical gain/loss for
cyber capabilities?

•

Is there a civilian equivalent to MDC2? What can military organizations learn
from commercial organizations and vice versa?

•

How can we foster the culture shift necessary to make distributed MDC2
effective?
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All of these questions need to be explored, and there are no easy answers.
However, the research effort into these questions could directly impact how military
organizations operate in the future.
This chapter defined MDC2 from an Air Force perspective. It compared and
contrasted MDC2 with current Joint Operational doctrine and showed how MDC2 is a
way to avoid the stove-piping that happens in Joint Operations. It analyzed the current
trend towards decentralized C2 structures with distributed control and identified
capability transparency as a key requirement for MDC2. Finally, we proposed a technical
solution that can provide capability transparency as well as enable effective distributed
control. It allows commanders to provide their intent, and then can they can leave it to
edge organizations to assemble missions based on this intent. Overall, this is a single step
towards a general solution that promotes integrated operations across multiple domains
and ultimately achieves decision superiority.
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III. Teaming with Silicon Valley to enable Multi-Domain Command and Control
3.1 Introduction
In recent years cyberspace has become a major focus as a new military
operational domain alongside land, sea, air, and space (in this context, “domain” refers to
a unique environment in which military forces operate). However, being excellent at
cyberwarfare is not enough if we cannot effectively coordinate warfighting efforts across
all operational domains. General Goldfien, the Air Force Chief of Staff, highlighted this
need: “Achieving a military advantage will depend on harnessing the vast amount of
information our sensors can generate, fusing it quickly into decision-quality information,
and creating effects simultaneously from any domain, region or command anywhere in
the world. This is why my third focus area is enhancing multi-domain command and
control.” Additionally, developing MDC2 capabilities was identified by Reith et al
(2016) as a key research area for operationalizing cyberspace [41]. Though the research
for this paper is being done in a U.S. Air Force context (thus the focus is on air, space,
and cyberspace), the concepts are applicable to any organization. This paper will define
MDC2, pull out some of the key problems that may have technical solutions, and show
how integrating DevOps, cloud-native platforms, and microservices-based applications
into the AOC can help solve these problems.
3.2 Definition of Multi-Domain Command and Control
MDC2 is difficult to define concisely. General Goldfien offers the following:
“Multi-domain battle is more than the ability to work in multiple domains. We already do
this quite effectively in today's Air Operations Centers. It is also more than operations in
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one domain supporting or complementing operations in another domain. An advanced
multi-domain operating concept (CONOPS) will exploit current and new capabilities as
well as integrate joint and coalition capabilities across all military operations. It will
allow us to both see more opportunities and generate more options for our nation's
leaders. Nominally, as either the Joint Forces Air Component Commander or Joint Forces
Commander facilitating a campaign, we will be responsible for the delivery and
articulation of joint fires. This responsibility mandates that we master MDC2. [26]”
MDC2 begins with data collection from multiple sources; this includes
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as other data sources such as
weather forecasts, maintenance schedules, or any other information pertinent to decision
makers. This data must then be processed and displayed effectively in order to enable
rapid decision making and produce effects. The key is that this process should be
completely domain agnostic. Data from multiple domains should be collected and
processed by intelligence experts in those domains, and then presented to decision
makers who will select a course of action to produce the effects needed to accomplish
their mission. This course of action includes capabilities and assets from multiple
domains all working together to produce the desired effects in the battlespace. In short,
the goal of MDC2 is to be able to efficiently utilize the unique capabilities/attributes of
land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace forces in an integrated manner to provide the most
options to friendly leadership, ensure military forces are being used most effectively, and
as a result presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas. This is not an entirely new goal,
but should be seen as further evolution of joint operations.
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3.3 Identifying Problems and Requirements
Now that we’ve defined MDC2, we can start looking at some major problems that
need to be solved. For the Air Force, command and control (C2) functions are primarily
based in regional AOCs, so the first step to conducting MDC2 is to ensure that the AOCs
are equipped to plan and execute multi-domain operations. Today there are personnel
from air, space, and cyberspace career fields working together, and there has been real
progress made in multi-domain operations. However, there are still “silos of excellence”
where collaboration is limited and overall effective MDC2 is limited to individual
missions rather than being the normal flow of operations. The main obstacles to
conducting MDC2 in the AOC today include:
•

Target development is done with kinetic operations in mind which limits non-kinetic
options during the planning phases

•

There is no way of providing planners with a multi-domain operational picture (lack
of integrated awareness)

•

There is no way for planners to be able to view all of the capabilities available to
them from multiple-domains

•

Though MDC2 happens because of SMEs that are able to coordinate efforts, there is
not a clearly defined workflow for MDC2 to make it part of the ordinary workflow in
the AOC

•

Current software cannot adapt to organizational/process changes in a timely fashion
These problems have the potential to be solved with new software tools. In the

past, new software has been released as part of major updates of the entire system (both
hardware and software). Which, for many reasons, means that it often takes nearly a
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decade to implement new software in the AOC, and if new requirements are identified it
can be months or even years before the changes are made. This in turn results in software
that can’t quickly adapt if the users find it to be counterintuitive, it lacks data sources that
they need, or their workflow has changed since the product was released. The result of all
of this is that when we look at the AOC today, we often find operators using spreadsheets
for tasks rather than tools designed for their work. Additionally, AOC users often express
frustration that the tools they use don’t talk to each other which results in duplication of
effort. Now we see that in order to develop effective MDC2 applications/tools we need a
practice with the following attributes:
•

Software needs to be developed in a timely manner (~6 months or less)

•

Applications need to be designed so that data can be easily shared between
themselves and new data feeds should be able to be quickly added as needed

•

User feedback needs to be collected for the entire application lifecycle and inform
further development

•

New features and/or changes to the application need to be implemented rapidly
without breaking the application and/or system

•

Software needs to be secure and reliable
The technical solution for MDC2 won’t be an application or even a collection of

applications. The solution will be a system architecture and software development
process that quickly releases applications and tools to the war fighter that can be adapted
as C2 operators learn how to more effectively conduct MDC2. Instead of reinventing the
wheel, we can look at the private sector and see what technologies and practices are out
there that the Air Force can adopt.
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3.4 DevOps and Microservices
In the private sector, one of the more successful software development practices is
known as DevOps [13]. The goal of DevOps is to closely integrate software development
with operation of the production environment. This is done through a collection of
automated tools for continuous testing, integration, and deployment as well as
infrastructure that can be easily configured through scripts (known as “infrastructure as
code”). DevOps practices and tools were specifically developed to build on the success of
agile development practices to enable more frequent deployment of software into the
operational environment which ultimately leads to faster release times. Though DevOps
is about uniting development and IT in order to promote more frequent deployment
cycles, the result is that users are able to give their feedback and see changes
implemented in a matter of weeks or months. The increased deployment cycle can also
result in a more secure product than traditional software acquisition methods.
The most common objection raised to DevOps and other agile software
development methodologies is that security is compromised in favor of faster
development time. However, the question itself seems to have an underlying assumption
that traditional software acquisition/development has produced secure software which is
not a safe assumption. DevOps toolsets include automated software scanning tools to
ensure developers are using best practices secure software design (e.g. ThreadFix,
SonarQube, and/or OWASP). Frequent deployment of new code can also be a security
feature itself. The frequent deployment cycles produced by DevOps allow for quick fixes
to security vulnerabilities when they are uncovered. Additionally, there has been
momentum recently to include cyber security professionals in the release cycle and
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DevOps tools (e.g. SDElements) designed specifically to promote collaboration and
communication between cyber security, development, and IT operation teams. DevOps
can be just as security-focused as any other software development cycle, and the more
frequent deployment of code means that security vulnerabilities can be identified and
fixed in a timely manner.
DevOps is often tied to another trend in software development, and that’s building
applications as a distributed system of independent microservices such that new
microservices can be added or changed without affecting the rest of the codebase. The
following figure shows how a simple application looks when implemented using both
microservices and monolithic architectures:

Figure 5: Microservices Architecture vs. Monolithic Architecture [51]
The application on the left is implemented using microservices, and we can see
that it contains three distinct, relatively small codebases, compared to the single large
codebase of the monolithic application. Each of these “microservices” do their specific
tasks and they communicate with other services using an API. This modular approach
provides several advantages. First, it allows the developers to make changes to their
codebase without having to worry about the changes affecting the other codebases which
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leads to more frequent deployments. Second, it can make high-availability more effective
by allowing each service to be scale as needed as opposed to having to scale the entire
monolithic application [42]. Finally, if the users end up requiring additional services, then
these can be added without changing the entire codebase. These advantages, however,
come at the cost of increased complexity up front. Villamizar et al explain:
“microservices introduce many problems of distributed systems (failures, timeouts,
distributed transactions, data federation, responsibility assignments, etc.) which make the
development process more complex in some areas. [51]” For small/simple applications it
may not make sense to use microservices. However, for larger, complex C2 applications
that need to be adaptable, this additional complexity up front is worth the increased
agility.
Bringing this all together, the table below shows how DevOps meets the
identified requirements for MDC2 application development:
Table 1: MDC2 Requirements and DevOps
DevOps Answers to MDC2 Requirements
MDC2 Application Development
DevOps Answer
Requirement
Rapid Software Release
Designed for reduced development timelines
Data Sharing
Additional data pipelines can be added as microservices
and/or application programming interfaces
User Feedback Informs Development
Development is iterative based on user feedback for the
entire lifecycle of the application
Frequent Changes and Updates
Designed to enable frequent deployment of new code
Security and Reliability
DevOps toolsets ensure secure software design
principles are followed

We see that DevOps along with microservices based application development provides
the attributes identified as necessary to develop effective MDC2 applications, but can
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these practices be implemented in military organizations? Does this approach produce
better results than traditional military software acquisition?
AFLCMC and DIUx are attempting just this. They utilize an open source cloudnative platform-as-a-service known as Cloud Foundry (which can be run in a commercial
or an on-premise cloud) along with several other continuous integration and automated
security scanning tools as a DevOps tool-chain to build and operate applications for the
AOC. Their work provides a case study to see if DevOps can be effectively implemented
in military organizations that have been attached to traditional software development
practices.
3.5 Analysis and Preliminary Results
The DevOps platform being used by AFLCMC/DIUx has built-in high
availability to ensure reliability of the applications being run on it as well as support for a
nearly infinite number of security tools and/or services. It should be noted that a “cloudnative platform” does not necessarily mean that the platform exists in a commercial cloud
managed by an outside entity because they can be just as easily run in an on-premises
cloud managed by the AOC itself with reach back to the development teams in the United
States. An on-premises cloud/data center would allow the AOC to use their C2 software
even in a contested environment, but also provide the agility inherent in cloud-native
platforms/infrastructure. The AOC is able to get the best of both worlds in this sense: the
flexibility of cloud-native architecture, and the control/security of traditional data centers.
The application developers also took advantage of microservices concepts in their
implementation. There are some dependencies between some of the modules/services
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because in early development stages these were implemented as a single module/service
but separated later on. However, during the development history new microservices have
been added to the application as distinct codebases without impacting the other modules.
The ability to add microservices later on was necessary to release the product quickly,
and it allowed the users to start using the application as a “minimum viable product”
while more advanced/luxury features were implemented later. One major issue with
traditional military acquisitions is that the scope becomes unmanageable because all
requirements are expected to be met at delivery, but with microservices the scope can
start small and be increased as needed during the iterative development/deployment
cycle.
At the time of writing, DIUx and AFLCMC had released one application for
production and daily use in the CAOC at Al-Udeid Air Base. This application is a tanker
planning tool used to plan all of the air refueling sorties in the AOC. The investment for
the project was $1.5M, and development began in November 2016, and the minimal
viable product was released in March 2017. The user feedback was overwhelmingly
positive, and the task of planning went from taking three people 6-8 hours to two people
taking 4 hours with the application. Work on the application continues, and
AFLCMC/DIUx is able to release a new update each week to production using their
DevOps toolchain. In contrast, AOC 10.2 (the project to update AOC systems using
traditional acquisitions methods) was nearing a decade of development, and the cost by
the end was $745 million [29]. This is one data point showing the success of DevOps
over traditional military software acquisitions.
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3.6 Future Work and Conclusion
More work is needed to continue to evaluate DevOps and microservices as the
paradigm for military software development, and specifically how it will impact the Air
Force’s C2 systems. Future questions include:
•

Do microservices enhance security by incentivizing regular updates or does the
additional complexity provide a larger attack surface?

•

What are the gaps in current DevOps toolsets?

•

Will a collection of small, independent, cloud-based applications, developed
iteratively with DevOps function better than the large system packages acquired
with traditional methods or is DevOps only successful on a small scale?

•

DevOps often relies on cloud-based platforms, how can we ensure the security of
these platforms?

•

Military software must meet rigid security/accreditation requirements; can
DevOps become “SecDevOps”?
In summary, MDC2 is absolutely necessary to make the most of cyberwarfare

capabilities and ensure that cyberspace functions as an operational domain equivalent to
air, land, and sea. As a result, effective software is needed to manage the complexities
involved in multi-domain operations. The success of AFLCMC/DIUx shows that DevOps
can be implemented in military organizations, and that it appears to produce high quality
software much faster than traditional methods and is able to adapt to changing needs of
the war-fighter.
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IV. Implementing DevOps in the U.S. Air Force: A Case Study of the AOC
Pathfinder Project
4.1 Introduction
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has been putting a considerable amount of time and
money into improving its command and control (C2) systems, concepts, and processes.
Many USAF leaders have recognized the need for more agile command and control, and
this can be seen in documents such as the Air Force Future Operating Concept (AFFOC)
which makes operational agility the central idea of how the USAF will operate in the year
2035 [15]. In the AFFOC, operational agility is defined to be: “the ability to rapidly
generate—and shift among—multiple solutions for a given challenge.” Because the
solution(s) for a given challenge could come from any operational do-main, in order to
fully achieve operational agility in modern environments it is necessary to develop
integrated MDC2 capabilities.
New software is a major part of meeting these requirements. However, new
software is ordinarily re-leased as part of a major update of the entire system baseline
(both hardware and software); which, for many reasons, means that it often takes nearly a
decade to implement new software in the Air Operating Center (AOC), and if new
requirements are identified it can be months or even years before the changes are made.
The result is software that can’t quickly be changed if the users find it counterintuitive, it
lacks data sources that they need, or their workflow has changed since the product was
released. We see that in order to develop effective MDC2 applications/tools the Air Force
needs:
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•

Software to be developed in a timely manner (~6 months or less)

•

Applications to be designed so that data can be easily shared between themselves
and new data feeds should be able to be quickly added as needed

•

User feedback to be collected during the entire application lifecycle and inform
further development

•

New features and/or changes to the application to be implemented rapidly
without breaking the application and/or system

•

Assurance that the software is secure and reliable

However, the effort to update the information systems in the AOC using traditional
military software development/acquisition practices was over budget and approaching
nearly a decade of work without any value being released to the users [29]. As a result,
the U.S. Air Force decided to cancel the contract and stand up an experimental unit
designated “AOC Pathfinder” to develop new software for the AOC using established
agile software development and DevOps best practices.
DevOps (short for Development Operations) is a philosophy or strategy that
leverages a set of automated tools and practices in order to integrate software
development and information technology operations teams with the goal of increasing
release frequency and reliability of software. DevOps takes advantage of tools that are
designed to automate as much of development process as possible as well as concepts
such as Infrastructure as Code (IaC) which allows the operations teams manage
infrastructure configurations as developers would manage source code and microservices
architecture which implements an application as a package of small, independent services
[2,3,56]. These practices are well established in the private sector, but the pathfinder
37

project had to implement DevOps in a way that also satisfies the rigid security and
reliability requirements demanded by the Air Force.
4.2 Risks
4.2.1 Personnel
Military software developers exist in limited numbers, but they are generally not
familiar with culture, tools, and processes necessary for effective agile software
development and DevOps, so every government-employed developer (and platform
operator) needed to learn agile/DevOps methodology as well as the technical background of the specific application they would be working on. Additionally, all the
recruited developers were pulled from other units on a temporary basis, so they would
have to leave the project after 3-6 months. The need for education plus the high turnover
posed a major risk to the success of the project. People needed to be on-boarded and
educated quickly, and they needed to be able to leave seamlessly without affecting the
lifecycle of their projects.
4.2.2 Security and Reliability
All new technology in the Air Force needs to be accredited before it can be
operated, and this process can take months if not years. The Air Force has been operating
with the unspoken assumption that a lengthy security review process after the software
has been developed is needed to ensure that the product is secure. This process required
to approve new software has been a major obstacle for Air Force software development
teams when trying to implement agile practices. AOC Pathfinder was especially
challenging because the applications would have to run in a classified production
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environment. Successfully implementing DevOps in this context would require a radical
culture shift.
4.2.3 Multiple Environments
The development is done in an unclassified environment on a regular commercial
network, but the production environment is classified, so a process needed to be
established to move code from the unclassified to classified environment. Initially, AOC
Pathfinder had to rely on another government organization’s commercial and .mil
environments to get its code approved and into production which created more
complexity for the platform teams. AOC Pathfinder has since established its own DevOps
environment, so only two environments need to be maintained at the time of writing.
4.3 Pathfinder Approach
After AOC Pathfinder was stood up, its leadership decided which software/tools
would be targeted first based on what was feasible as a proof of concept and met a
genuine need then they recruited a team consisting product managers, designers, and
engineers to build the first product using the process outlined in Figure 6. In order to
mitigate the risks outlined in section two, AOC Pathfinder utilized Pair Programming, a
DevOps process focused on continuous security, and a toolset to help manage the
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development testing and deployment in multiple environments.

Figure 6: AOC Pathfinder Process [12]
4.3.1 Pair Programming
The Air Force itself did not have development teams with knowledge and culture
required for successful agile software development, so we teamed with Pivotal Labs and
utilized pairing to equip our personnel with the knowledge and culture of agile software
development. Every government employee was teamed with an equivalent Pivotal
employee (government developer with Pivotal developer, government designer with
Pivotal designer, government product manager with Pivotal product manager, etc.) and
given on the job training. Special “pairing stations” are set up so that a pair can share a
computer while each person has their own monitor, mouse, and keyboard. One person in
the pair is “driving” while the other is observing, learning, and correcting mistakes, and
at any time they can switch roles. This process allows personnel to be onboarded to their
project and start being productive almost immediately (2-4 weeks depending on
individual ability), and ensures that no one person becomes a single point of failure. As
more government employees become experienced with agile software development and
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DevOps, the project is able to rely less on Pivotal employees, and more on government
personnel.
4.3.2 SecDevOps
If DevOps is the term used to describe tools and practices that closely integrate
the development and IT operations teams, then we can call the tools and practices intended to integrate security, development, and operations teams “SecDevOps” [35]. The
AOC Pathfinder used two primary lines of effort in order to be able to deploy code
frequently and at the same time meet the security and accreditation requirements.
First, it followed what is known as the “ATO-in-a-day” concept, an “ATO” is also
known as “approval to operate”. This entails accrediting the platform that the application
code will run in, and accrediting the pipline that deploys new code to the production
environment. Once trust is established in the platform and the pipeline, then the new code
that’s developed inherits this trust and re-quires little time to be approved before being
deployed.
The second line of effort was to ensure that security became a continuous practice
rather than being tacked on at the end. Initially, security scanning tools helped ensure that
secure software design principles were being followed, but documentation was largely
pushed until the time came to get approval for the first production release, so the initial
release of an application would be delayed several weeks. To remedy this, AOC
Pathfinder decided to add SDElements to the toolset to help the security team
continuously create security task for the development and platform teams, track the
projects, and document them in order to ensure that when the application is ready to be
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released for the first time all security tasks and documentation needed by the approving
official is also completed. This continuous security process with SDElements is shown in
Figure 7.

Figure 7: Continuous Security [47]

4.3.3 SecDevOps Toolset
All of the applications developed by AOC Pathfinder run inside Pivotal Cloud
Foundry (PCF). PCF is a cloud-native Platform-as-a-Service that we ran on a commercial
cloud for the development/testing environment and an on-premise cloud for the
production environment. It provides the applications with any services they require as
well as scaling, load balancing, and high-availability to ensure smooth operation.
Pivotal Tracker is the tool used for agile lifecycle management (ALM). It is used
to track all tasks that need to be done as “stories” as well as metrics such as velocity
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(number of stories completed over time) to help the product owner/manager gauge the
health of a project.
GitLab is the code repository in all of the environments.
Concourse is the primary Continuous Integration (CI) tool which manages all of
the pipelines and ensures that code goes through all the automated scans before being
accepted. There are several automated scanning tools to ensure code quality and security
notably:
•

Lint-js-java: A tool used for the unit and integration tests for a given application.
It runs at the very start of the pipeline to determine if any code regressions have
occurred.

•

Journeys: An acceptance test tool that walks through the application as if it were
the end user. Ensures that the application functions as expected with the new
code.

•

OWASP: A dependency scanner that checks all of the code dependencies for
known vulnerabilities

•

Fortify: Static code analysis tool that checks to ensure the code follows best
practices for se-cure software design

•

SonarQube: Scanning tool that checks for code quality as well as security
vulnerabilities

•

ThreadFix: Consolidates the results from the vulnerability scanning tools and
builds re-ports

•

SDElements: Introduced later in the project timeline to manage the
security/accreditation for each application. Takes security scans as input, creates
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specific tasks based on the security policy baseline, integrates with the agile
lifecycle management tool (Pivotal Tracker in our case), and automatically creates
reports that meet the documentation requirements needed for approval
This toolset is designed to enable frequent deployments of new code into multiple
environments, and at the same time ensure that all the documentation required for
accreditation is ready by the time an application is ready for release into production.
4.4 Results
At the time of writing, the pathfinder project has success-fully released three
applications into production using the concepts, processes and toolset presented in this
article. Each of these applications were released as a Minimally Viable Product (MVP)
three to four months after development started. The first application was released at the
end of March 2017, and by June 2017 the users had completely abandoned their old
tools/process in favor of the new application. The other two were released in November
2017, but have not yet reached the point that they have completely replaced the old
tools/processes. None of the products were satisfactory at the time of initial release
because the goal was to get something in the hands of users in order to gather feedback
and improve the product. Users are able to use the applications while at the same time use
their standard tools/processes when needed until the product is able to completely replace
their old tools/process.
That being said, the development teams continuously gather feedback from 100%
of the users who touch the applications, and all the users are satisfied with the project
because they know that their concerns will eventually be addressed. The SecDevOps
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process enables up-dates to be released into the production environment on a weekly
basis, so pressing issues can be addressed quickly.

Figure 8: Burnup Charts
The practice of paired programming allowed the team to develop the products at a
consistent rate even with the heavy training/education requirements and frequent turnover
of personnel. Figure 8 contains burnup charts showing the number of tasks or “stories”
completed over time for the first three applications released. The significance of Figure 3
is that the development teams were able to maintain a consistent development rate for
even with the three to six-month turnover rate. Application 1 shows this most clearly
because work on it has been going on for more than a year. The other two have only been
in development for six months or less, so they haven’t yet had to replace a significant
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number of the developers. It should be noted that the spike in August 2017 for
Application 2 is due to the development team taking a two-week trip to the AOC where
they worked much longer hours than normal (you can also see a brief dip where the team
was recovering from this trip), but after this sprint the development progresses at a
normal rate. The bottom line from this data is that AOC Pathfinder was able to teach new
developers the tools, languages, culture, and processes they needed to know in order to be
successful without significantly impacting ongoing development.
Though AOC Pathfinder is still in its early stages, the success so far shows that
organizations with large beurocratic obstacles and stringent software security and
accreditation requirements are able to use (Sec)DevOps processes and toolsets to produce
software that meets security and accreditation requirements and ultimately satisfies their
customers
4.5 Lessons Learned
Three key lessons have been learned over the course of the AOC Pathfinder
Project.
First, due to different uses of the term “operations” in the military, many people
think that DevOps refers to developers and users working together because the users in
this case are often known as “operators”, so there sometimes can be an overemphasis on
the development team over the platform operations team, so it’s crucial for leadership to
understand the importance of IT operations in DevOps. The pipelines, staging and
production environments all need to be maintained by an effective platform team to
ensure smooth operations.
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Second, a dedicated security team that is integrated with the development and
operations teams is needed to ensure that the project is meeting all security requirements.
Through the continuous security process, the security team enforces established security
policies and tracks the tasks that need to be completed so that the application can be
approved in a timely manner. The security team for AOC Pathfinder also took steps to
ensure sensitive project information was being properly handled by the
development/platform teams. Integrating continuous security into the DevOps process is
necessary for organizations like the U.S. Air Force that have to meet stringent security
requirements. If there’s an effective security team monitoring the project, then the rapid
release cycle of SecDevOps could in fact be a net gain for software security since
security flaws can be fixed soon after they are identified.
Finally, working in pairs helps ensure that new people are quickly trained and
become productive team members. It also helps ensure that critical project information is
distributed across the team, and no one person becomes a single point of failure. In
addition to the training benefits, pairing has built in quality assurance because there is
always someone reviewing the work being and it also can have a positive impact to
morale. However, some personalities may not be conducive to a paired working
environment, so it’s important to recruit people who are able to work well in this
environment.
4.6 Remaining Questions
Now that AOC Pathfinder has shown the success of its SecDevOps process as an
experimental project we will have to see if SecDevOps can be institutionalized across an

47

organization like the Air Force. Some could argue that the success of the project is due to
a unique circumstance where the right people were brought together at the right time. Can
this process scale and sustain itself long term?
Along similar lines, the applications developed so far are tightly scoped for
specific tasks, and are or will be very good at doing those tasks. The long-term vision is
that eventually all of the software in the AOC will be replaced by a set of applications
built and maintained through the SecDevOps process either by refactoring the legacy
application or building a new one from scratch. The open question then is whether a set
of cloud-native applications replace the entire AOC software suite. Can the whole
function as well as the individual components?
This process so far has worked very well for command and control software
which is the primary scope for this project, but there are many other software
development efforts in the U. S. Air Force. It’s doubtful that the toolset used to build and
sustain command and control software will be able to be used for scenarios where
hardware and software are tightly coupled such as embedded systems because the agility
of the toolset relies on the cloud-platform that operates the applications. AOC Pathfinder
was able to release code frequently be-cause Cloud Foundry was trusted platform that
was hardware agnostic. Can non-C2 software development teams benefit from some of
these practices? How can software that is tightly coupled with hardware be re-leased
frequently?
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4.7 Conclusion
The example of AOC Pathfinder shows that DevOps does not have to be
antithetical to software security and reliability, so companies that have to meet tight
security regulations can look at the example of AOC Pathfinder and experiment with
similar tools and processes for their software. Though this case-study is most relevant to
military organizations and command and control software, the tools and practices are
applicable for nearly any set of software applications that can be operated in an onpremises data center or commercial cloud. The toolset listed here accomplished AOC
Pathfinder’s goals, and their team found these tools to be most useful to them, but there
are many different tools available for organizations to experiment with and find what
works best for their situation. AOC Pathfinder was ultimately successful because they
were able to adopt the proper DevOps toolsets and practices that met their unique
requirements.
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V. Final Analysis and Conclusion
This chapter presents additional analysis of DevOps, vignettes of the first three
applications developed by AOC Pathfinder, answers the research questions in light of the
material presented thus far, proposes future research areas, and concludes.
5.1 Significance of Security in DevOps
Cybersecurity is a major concern for C2 systems, especially when classified data
is involved. As the previous chapters highlight, security teams should be integrated with
DevOps to ensure that the teams are meeting the standards required for accreditation.
The team is responsible for operational security of the project itself, this includes
password management, offboarding team members who leave the project, controlling
access to sensitive project information, etc. However, the approval authority for the
development pipeline and platform should be independent to maintain proper checks and
balances.
While the frequency of new code being released into production with DevOps is a
net gain for security, this is only true for the applications themselves and the platform
they operate inside. DevOps by itself will not contribute to the security of the enterprise
network, or the security of accounts outside the environment such as email. It may
eventually be helpful to consolidate all C2 systems in an operations center into one
environment that can be managed, but that also may introduce a reliability problem
because the DevOps platform becomes a single point of failure.
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5.2 Limitations of DevOps
DevOps requires an environment with flexible infrastructure and software that is
hardware agnostic. The infrastructure needs to be able to adapt quickly to changes in the
application, so the practices presented in this work will not be as effective for software
development projects where software is tied to unique hardware that is not flexible such
as embedded systems. Software development may still be able to use agile software
development lifecycles, but it will be difficult for those projects to use DevOps toolsets. .
DevOps is best suited for developing applications designed to run in an on-premise data
center or commercial cloud environment.
Also, DevOps toolsets must be used by people who are willing to embrace agile
software development culture and work as a team. When recruiting personnel for AOC
Pathfinder, a deciding factor was the ability to work in a team. Especially since training
was done primarily through the practice of pairing new team members with experienced
team members in the culture, processes, and tools for DevOps.
5.3 Pathfinder Application Vignettes
The first application developed by AOC Pathfinder is known as Tanker Planner
Tool (TPT). Tanker planners in the AOC have to ensure that every plane on the ATO had
enough fuel to complete its mission using the aerial refueling planes available to them.
The task is more complex than simply assigning a new refueler to each plane that needs
fuel both because of the limited number of refuelers, and because it is more fuel efficient
to reroute a nearby refueler already in the air. TPT manages all the calculations needed
for this process (e.g. how much fuel each plane needs, how many refueling missions a
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specific refueler can meet, etc.), and can even automatically build a refueling plan on its
own with a single click.
The second application is known as Dynamic Targeting Tool (DTT) and it
manages the entire workflow for dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting is when a target
of opportunity is identified and action must be taken within hours or minutes rather than
the days needed to go through the normal ATO cycle. Each target must be identified, be
approved using Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) criteria, and assets with appropriate
munitions must be identified and routed to the target. DTT must interface with all the
legacy software that hosts the data needed by the dynamic targeting team, and ensure that
targets are tracked through the entire process.
The third application, known as Target Production Manager (TPM), manages the
longer targeting cycle known as “deliberate targeting.” It was originally envisioned to
manage the entire lifecycle of a target from the earliest identification stage to mission
analysis. However, the scope of the project was limited to the last stages of target
development that is actually done by users in the AOC. Like DTT, it also must interface
with legacy software to acquire needed data, and manage the entire workflow of the
deliberate targeting team.
5.4 Research Questions
1. How can software enhance the Air Force’s ability to conduct MDC2?
Chapter II examined the MDC2 problem and concluded that two key requirements for
MDC2 are integrated awareness and effective command relationships and presented some
examples of how software can address these requirements. One way to help provide
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integrated awareness would be to build an application that can present a multi-domain
common operating picture (COP); such an application would enable operators to
understand the battlespace for each domain and how the domains are connected. The
capability transparency application proposed in that chapter would both help provide
integrated awareness by showing planners what capabilities are available to them in a
domain-agnostic manner, and it also would provide more effective command
relationships by providing planners with the channel they need to use to gain approval to
use any given capability.
Also, though AOC Pathfinder was not intended to develop MDC2 software, the target
development applications could have features implemented that enhance the Air Force’s
MDC2 capabilities. For example, the TPM development team could increase the scope of
their application in the future and ensure that the proper intelligence is collected during
the target development cycle to provide multi-domain options at the end of the cycle
rather than developing a target with kinetic effects in mind.
The ultimate goal of MDC2 software is to help operators make better decisions and to
make them faster. The above examples are good starting points, and more requirements
will be developed as MDC2 experimentation continues.
2. What software development practices have attributes that will aid MDC2
software development and experimentation?
Chapter II highlighted that the Air Force is still experimenting with MDC2, so software
needs to be able to adapt to changing user requirements. Chapter III then examined
DevOps since the goal of DevOps is to develop new software in months or weeks rather
than the years that it often takes using traditional military software
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development/acquisition, and DevOps is designed to enable frequent release of new code
so software can adapt to the user’s changing needs. Chapter III also examined
microservices architecture as another means of making MDC2 software more flexible to
changing needs. AOC Pathfinder has utilized both of these concepts as it is developing
C2 software for the AOC. In the near term, the AOC is where the Air Force conducts
MDC2, so the methodology used by Pathfinder should be adopted by early MDC2
developers as a baseline. Then the methodology can be adapted as needed.
Additionally, it should be noted that MDC2 software is not qualitatively different
from single-domain C2 software (it is quantitatively different because there is more
information and people to manage), so software development practices that work for C2
software can work for MDC2 software. Which is why the Pathfinder project is used as a
case study for MDC2 software development. The software development practices that are
successful for Pathfinder should also be successful for MDC2 developers.
3. What are the attributes of the AOC Pathfinder Project that enabled it to develop
software using DevOps?
Chapter IV examined the AOC Pathfinder project to show that DevOps can be
implemented in organizations with a highly regulatory environment, and highlight the
attributes that made that project successful. Specifically, the chapter highlighted pairing
as a means of training new team members, integrated security teams, the ATO-in-a-day
concept, and the DevOps toolset used by Pathfinder to accomplish its goals as the main
attributes contributing to the project’s success thus far.
In addition to these attributes, the Pathfinder project embraced Silicon Valley’s
entrepreneurial culture. DevOps is designed to encourage developers to test new
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solutions, and be able to quickly recover when something doesn’t work, and Pathfinder
leadership was risk-tolerant and understood that failure is often part of the process, so
developers were able to take risks without fear of reprisal. Grade/Rank was also
secondary to knowledge and skill, so a non-commissioned officer could be a project
manager leading a team of developers that included commissioned officers if he or she
was the best person for the position. The project also actively worked with personnel
from private industry in order to develop this culture in the government team members.
Actively encouraging this culture is crucial to promote creative problem solving and
avoid falling back into old patterns.
5.5 Future Work and Conclusion
5.5.1 Platform Evaluation
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Pivotal Cloud Foundry has been the platform
used to manage the infrastructure, deploy, and operate applications by the DevOps teams
examined in this work (see Appendix A for an overview of PCF). Though it’s been
successfully used by AOC Pathfinder, future work should evaluate PCF against
competitors such as Amazon’s Elastic Beanstalk. How reliable is PCF in the long term
compared to the competition? Are there significant performance differences on similar
hardware? The success of any DevOps project is intricately tied to the platform used to
manage the hardware resources, so research is needed to investigate the advantages and
disadvantages of available platform services and determine which one(s) best fit the
needs for developing MDC2 software.
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5.5.2 Tool Evaluation
This work does not evaluate or advocate for specific tools since the scope of this work is
limited to evaluating DevOps as a philosophy and practice in the military for developing
C2 software. More research needs to be done to test the specific tools used to make up a
DevOps toolset, and evaluate tools against each other since there is a wide variety of
commercial and open source tools available designed for DevOps. This includes code
scanning tools, pipeline management tools, agile project management tools, etc. While
the tools used by AOC Pathfinder have been effective, a rigorous analysis and evaluation
of the major available tools is necessary so that DevOps teams can make informed
decisions when building their toolsets.
Future research should also examine whether the toolsets should be standardized
from project to project or even application to application. For example, a code scanning
tool that works well on a Java-based application may not be as effective for an
application that is written mostly with Python. However, using different tools may make
accreditation more difficult and introduce too many complexities for security teams to
manage. How can the toolset flexibility that developers may want be balanced with the
standardization that security and accreditation teams would like to have?
5.5.3 DevOps Pipeline Security
Confidence in the security of an application developed and deployed in a DevOps
environment is tied to the security of the pipeline that deploys the code. What is the best
way to ensure that the code released into the environment is hasn’t been altered from
what the trusted developer wrote? How could an adversary get around current protections
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and deploy malicious code? If malicious code is released how can it be detected?
Research is needed to evaluate current techniques and detect/address any gaps in current
pipeline security.
5.5.4 Conclusion
MDC2 is a concept that is still being actively studied by C2 operators and subject
matter experts, so the software requirements are going to change as MDC2 concepts are
developed and tested. DevOps can be implemented in highly regulated organizations like
the U.S. military (or any other highly regulated organization) and is effective at
promoting, interaction between users, software developers, and infrastructure operators
resulting in rapid response to user feedback which will allow developers to meet the
flexibility that MDC2 demands. This work supports the hypothesis that DevOps toolsets
and practices are effective at developing C2 software, and can be successfully
implemented by the Air Force to enhance its MDC2 capabilities. Therefore, DevOps
should be embraced by the Air Force in order to continue enhancing its MDC2
capabilities.
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Appendix A. Pivotal Cloud Foundry Overview
PCF is a platform for rapidly developing, deploying, and executing applications. It is a
Cloud-Native Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) that can run on any kind of hardware
infrastructure whether it is in a commercial cloud (e.g. Amazon Web Services or
Microsoft Azure) or on an on-premises data center using vSphere, Open Stack, etc. It
provides the application with any and all services it requires and provides scaling and
load balancing to ensure smooth operation. The following diagram gives us a high-level
overview of PCF’s components that make up the platform:

Figure 9: Pivotal Cloud Foundry Architecture [54]
Starting from the top of the above architecture we’ll go through the layers to show how
PCF functions at a high level:
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•

In the routing layer, the router handles all incoming traffic for both the hosted
applications and the other PCF component VMs

•

The authentication layer provides identity management and role-based access
control for users

•

The application lifecycle layer manages the deployment of applications through
the cloud controller, allocates all application tasks/processes to cells/containers
through an auction algorithm, constantly monitors the state of all application
instances, and starts and stops processes as required

•

The application storage and execution layers consist of Diego Cells that host
application instances and the Blob Store that hosts large binary files such as
application code packages

•

The services layer consists of services internal or external to the PCF
environment which implement PCF’s Service Broker API in order to provide the
applications with needed services such as databases or other third-party services

•

The messaging layer allows components within PCF to send messages using
HTTP/S with Consul being used to store data long term and the Bulletin Board
System (BBS) being used to store frequently updated data

•

The metrics and logging layer provides a Log Aggregator that streams
application logs to the developers

•

Finally, all of these components (including hosted applications) can be scaled
horizontally by creating more instances and distributed into Availability Zones in
order to provide high availability
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PCF manages deployed applications through Diego (see Figure 10). Diego is the runtime
powering PCF, and it does so by scheduling tasks and long-running processes (LRPs). A
task is an action to be run at most once for a finite amount of time whereas LRPs can run

Figure 10 Diego Architecture [54]
continually. It receives requests from the Cloud Controller (which at the time of writing
must be translated into tasks/LRPs by the CC-Bridge) and the router. These requests for
tasks and LRPs are posted to the BBS. As tasks/LRPs are being posted to the BBS, the
Auctioneer is allocating batches of these jobs to Cells for execution. The Auctioneer
prioritizes the jobs, and then the cells “bid” with their suitability to complete the jobs, and
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finally the Auctioneer assigns jobs based on the following criteria (in order of priority)
[6]:
1. Allocate all jobs only to Cells that have the correct software stack to host them,
and sufficient resources given their allocation so far during this auction.
2. Allocate LRP instances into Availability Zones that are not already hosting other
instances of the same LRP.
3. Within each Availability Zone, allocate LRP instances to run on Cells that are not
already hosting other instances of the same LRP.
4. Allocate any job to the Cell that has lightest load, from both the current auction
and jobs it has been running already. In other words, distribute the total load
evenly across all Cells.
In this way, the Diego Brain allocates all job requests to the Diego Cells hosting the
appropriate applications and maximizes efficiency and availability by distributing the
load evenly across the Cells. Then each Cell then has a Rep that represents the Cell in the
BBS to receive and respond to requests as described above, one or many containers
managed by Garden, and a Metron agent that forwards application logs to the developers
From start to finish the platform manages all of the overhead so applications run
smoothly and developers can focus on building high quality software.
In addition to being a platform for application execution, PCF makes it easy for
developers to continuously integrate and deploy their code in accordance with the
DevOps philosophy. Once code is “pushed” to PCF through the command line it is
running within 30 minutes. Also, PCF supports tools such as Concourse CI or Jenkins
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which allow developers to include automated static and dynamic analysis tools for code
quality and security assurance (e.g. Sonarqube, Fortify) as well as dependency and
vulnerability scans before deploying to the operational PCF environment. Using these
automated tools enforce accepted secure software design principles and ensure code is
being tested for quality throughout the entire development process. These tools also
encourage frequent deployments which allows users to quickly test new features and
provide feedback to developers creating the feedback loop that empowers effective
DevOps.
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